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This issue marks a quarter century of *EAP*! We thank readers renewing subscriptions and include a reminder for “delinquents.” We are grateful to subscribers who contributed more than the base subscription. Thank you!


This issue begins with an entry honoring the memory of British-African novelist **Doris Lessing**, who recently passed away at the age of 94. The issue includes four essays, the first of which is by naturalist **Paul Krafel**, who considers how our lived obliviousness might be transformed into charitable actions. In turn, independent researcher **Stephen Wood** explores how we might become more alert emotionally to the current plight of the Earth.

In the first of this issue’s two longer entries, architectural researchers **Marco Cesario**, **Lena Hop-sch** and **Rachel McCann** use Norwegian architect **Niels Torp’s** Nils Ericson Bus Terminal, in Gothenberg, Sweden, to demonstrate the possibility of multi-sensory design. Second, philosopher **Jeff Malpas** reinterprets philosopher **Martin Heidegger’s** understanding of “dwelling” and “place.”

IHSR Conference & Website

The 33rd **International Human Science Research Conference** will be held August 12–15, 2014, at St. Francis Xavier University, in Antigonish, Nova Scotia, Canada. The conference theme is “Advancing Human Science: Recovering Subjectivity, Relation, Process.” <http://ihsrc.stfx.ca/>. The conference is an opportunity to explore the use of qualitative methods in the study of human nature. There has been a strong phenomenological tradition at the heart of the IHSRC but researchers from other qualitative traditions also frequently attend and are very welcome.

In 2011, a website was established for the annual IHSR conferences by the Open University’s **Darren Langdridge**, Professor of Psychology. This website serves as the network home for the conferences (IHSRC) and a repository for material of relevance to the human-sciences research community. The annual IHSRC newsletter is available at: www.seattleu.edu/artsci/map/ihsrc/. For the IHSRC website, go to: www.open.ac.uk/socialsciences/ihsrc/.



*Left: A San Francisco department-store advertisement reproduced in Jessica Ellen Sewell’s *Women and the Everyday City: Public Space in San Francisco, 1890–1915* (Univ. of Minnesota Press, 2011). “Several advertisements, including this one for Butler Brothers, showed hands going through windows to pull customers off the street” (p. 36). Original from the *Modern Grocer*, 1911 (see p. 4).*

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Items of Interest

The 6th annual symposium of the **Forum for Architecture, Culture and Spirituality** will be held at Trinity College, Toronto, June 5–8, 2014. The conference focus is “The Architecture of Spirituality in a Multicultural Setting.” The conference will include a keynote lecture by McGill Architecture Professor **Alberto Pérez-Gómez**; and a “sacred space tour” of Toronto buildings, gardens, and urban settings. www.acsforum.org/symposium2014/.

Green Humanities is a peer-reviewed, online journal of ecological thought in literature, philosophy and the arts. The editors seek articles (4,500–7,500 words) considering the role of the humanities in addressing contemporary environmental concerns. The editors also seek poems (10–40 lines) dealing with ecological and environmental themes. Contact: Co-Editors **Peter Schulman** (pschulma@odu.edu) and **Josh Weinstein** (jweinstein@vwc.edu). www.greenhumanities.org/

News from Readers

Sarah Reagan is a naturopathic health practitioner focusing on equine medicine. She is the author of *Equine Nutrition: From a Species Appropriate Perspective* (2013). In the last several years, she has become interested in phenomenological and hermeneutic approaches to animal experience, particularly the life-world of horses. In turn, this focus led her to Goethean science, about which she writes: “Goethean

science was literally my ‘return to Ithaca’—my coming home. I felt I had found a mode of science missing from the conventional education system, and I embraced it completely. I believe Goethean science can legitimately be brought into the modern world—infused within every scientific discipline. I hope to dedicate professional work toward recognition and mainstream integration of Goethean science and hermeneutic phenomenology, especially in animal studies and, in particular, for the domestic horse.”

Volume on Place Attachment

In 1992, psychologist **Irwin Altman** and anthropologist **Setha Low** published the collection, *Place Attachment*, a volume in the Plenum series, “Human Behavior and Environment,” edited by Altman and psychologist **Joachim F. Wohlwill**. Altman and Low defined place attachment as “the bonding of people to places” (p. 2). The volume’s 13 chapters explored how “place attachment is a complex and multifaceted concept worthy of systematic analysis” (p. 3).

To provide an update of place-attachment research, psychologists **Lynne C. Manzo** and **Patrick Devine-Wright** have edited *Place Attachment: Advances in Theory, Methods and Applications* (Routledge, 2014), a collection of 15 chapters by psychologists, sociologists, geographers, landscape architects, and natural-resource researchers. In their introduction, Manzo and Devine-Wright agree with contributor **Daniel R. Williams’s** conclusion in his chapter, “Some Methodological Reflections on Place Attachment Research,” that “the best collective strategy for studying relationships to place remains a critical pluralist one that recognizes that no one research program by itself can successfully engage the various facets of place” (p. 97).

Chapters in the edited collection include: “Dynamics of Place Attachment in a Climate-Changed World” (**Patrick Devine-Wright**); “‘The Frayed Knot’: What Happens to Place Attachment in the Context of Serial Forced Displacement?” (**Mindy Thompson Fullilove**); “Place Attachment in an Age of Mobility” (**Per Gustafson**); “Do not Detach! Instructions for Community Design” (**Randolph T. Hester, Jr.**); “In Search of Roots: Memory as Enabler of Place Attachment” (**Maria Lewicka**); “Exploring the Shadow Side: Place Attachment in the

Context of Stigma, Displacement, and Social Housing” (Lynne C. Manzo); “Comparing the Theories of Interpersonal and Place Attachment” (Leila Scanell and Robert Gifford); and “Place Attachment and Phenomenology” (David Seamon).

Citations Received

Anna Barbara & Anthony Perliss, 2006. *Invisible Architecture: Experiencing Places through the Sense of Smell*. NY: Rizzoli.

This book is said to explore “the dense interweave between the sense of smell and architecture and is enriched by the contributions of designers and perfumers exchanging thoughts and ideas... Why aren’t odors—beyond fragrances, perfumes, candles or incense—used as ingredients in the design process? Why is the olfactory dimension never explored by those outside of the world of perfume and chemistry? What is the architecture of olfactory structures?”

Victoria Bergsagel, Tim Best, Kathleen Chasman, Lorne McConachie, Wendy Sauer, & David Stephen, 2007. *Architecture for Achievement: Building Patterns for Small School Learning*. Mercer island, WA: Architecture for Achievement.

Drawing on the pattern-language approach of **Christopher Alexander**, these architects and educators present “patterns for effective smaller-school design (replete with photographs, diagrams, and practical suggestions) and offer a common language for all those who are interested in developing more powerful learning environments.” The authors identify several guiding principles for student success—personalization, focused learning, collaboration, community connections, and flexibility—and then highlight patterns that include human scale, greeting and gatekeeping, wayfinding and streetscapes, distributed resources, safety, fitness, transparency, and so forth.

Linda Finlay, 2012. *Unfolding the Phenomenological Research Process*. *Journal of Humanistic Psychology*, vol. 53, no. 2, pp. 172–201.

This psychotherapist identifies five aspects of phenomenological research: (1) embracing the phenomenological attitude; (2) entering the lifeworld through descriptions of experience; (3) dwelling with horizons of implicit meanings; (4) explicating the phenomenon holistically; and (5) integrating frames of reference. She writes: “I value our common [phenomenological] heritage and see it as something that requires emphasis and celebration. Inspired by the fact that for many of us phenomenology is something of a calling, I have in the course of this article

sought to identify and put into words what it is that ‘calls’ us so powerfully and insistently.”

Joe L. Frost, 2010. *A History of Children’s Play and Play Environments: Toward a Contemporary Child-Saving Movement*. NY: Routledge.

This book provides “a history of children’s play and play environments.” It argues that today “we need to re-establish play as a priority” and “to preserve children’s free, spontaneous outdoor play... and natural and built play environments.”

Howard Gillette, Jr., 2010. *Civitas by Design: Building Better Communities, from the Garden City to the New Urbanism*. Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press.

A history and evaluation of “environmental intervention” in American planning and design. This planner concludes that today there are three alternatives to the current dominant “market urbanism”: *New urbanism* (said to be proscriptive and normative); *everyday urbanism* (associated with **Jane Jacobs** and embracing everyday life “with little pretense of achieving and ideal environment”); and a *post urbanism* (associated with **Rem Koolhaas** and discounting “shred values as no longer possible in a fragmented world”).

William A. Gleason, 2011. *Sites Unseen: Architecture, Race, and American Literature*. NY: New York Univ. Press.

This scholar of English examines “a variety of expressive American vernacular forms, including the dialect tale, the novel of empire, letters, and pulp stores, along with the plantation cabin, the West Indian cottage, the Latin American plaza, and the ‘Oriental’ parlor.” The aim is “a more comprehensive consideration of the literary and cultural meanings of American Architecture” and “making sense of the relations between architecture, race, and American writings” in the 19th century.

Gail F. Melson, Peter H. Kahn, Jr., Alan Beck, Batya Firedman, Trace Roberts, Erik Garrett, & Brian T. Gill, 2009. *Children’s Behavior toward and Understanding of Robotic and Living Dogs*. *Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology*, vol. 30, pp. 92–102.

Though not phenomenological but quantitative, this study is significant in exploring how human beings understand and encounter robots, in this case Sony’s robotic dog, AIBO. Based on 72 children’s reasoning about and behaviors in relation to AIBO vs. a real dog (an Australian Shepherd), the authors conclude that “more children conceptualized the live dog, as com-

pared to AIBO, as having physical essences, mental states, sociality, and moral standing. Children also spent more time touching and within arms' distance of the live dog... However, a surprising majority of children conceptualized and interacted with AIBO in ways that were like a live dog. For example, over 60% of the children affirmed that AIBO had mental states, sociality, and moral standing; and children were as likely to give AIBO commands as a living dog." The authors conclude by asking "whether it is possible that a new technological genre is emerging that challenges traditional ontological categories."

Kiel Moe & Ryan E. Smith, 2012. *Building Systems: Design Technology and Society*. NY: Routledge.

Though none directly, several chapters in this volume intimate possibilities for a phenomenology of architectural technologies. In "Glass and Light," for example, architect Thomas Leslie explores "the influence of interior illumination on the 'Chicago School'" (chap. 6). Similarly, architect Tom F. Peters considers "how the introduction of iron in construction changed and developed through patterns in design" (chap. 2). The editors conclude with a useful annotated bibliography, the headings of which are "design, technology and society"; "building systems"; "building economics"; and "building ecologies."

Edward Relph, 2013. *Toronto: Transformations in a City and Its Region*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

This Torontonian, geographer, and author of *Place and Placelessness* "traces the city's development from a British colonial outpost... to the multicultural, polycentric metropolitan region of today." Relph's portrait of Toronto "draws on the ideas of two renowned Torontonians—**Jane Jacobs** and **Marshall McLuhan**—to provide an interpretation of how its current forms and landscapes came to be as they are, the values they embody, and how they may change once again."

Simon Richards, 2012. *Architect Knows Best: Environmental Determinism in Architecture*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate.

This art historian examines the contentious design claim that "the right kind of building can transform us into happier, healthier, better people." Richards covers a wide range of conceptual and practice traditions, including New Urbanism, postmodernism, deconstruction, phenomenology, linguistics, semiotics, and instrumentalist environmental psychology. His interpretations are often questionable (for example, he misunderstands the theory of space syntax and portrays phenomenology simplistically), but he does point out how the assumption that built worlds plays a central role in human worlds is drawn upon in a wide array of practical, political, and ethical ways that often conflict and offer little or no real-world support: "[These arguments] should be handled more responsibly, with a greater

awareness of the prejudices and value-judgments that often they represent, especially as no other profession [i.e., architecture] seems quite so eager to proclaim itself ready, willing and able to save the world and everyone in it. Nor would it harm if this discussion were held more openly, providing less of a hurdle for the non-specialist who does not have the time or luxury to disinter these ideas... from beneath the awful glutinous theory" (p. 157).

Graham D. Rowles & Miriam Bernard, 2013. *Environmental Gerontology: Making Meaningful Places in Old Age*. NY: Springer.

"The environments in which people live out their later lives have a strong impact on their identity and provide opportunities for nourishing social interactions. This volume translates the insights derived from contemporary research on residential environments and public spaces that enhance well-being into practical recommendations for the design of such beneficial community environments."

Jessica Ellen Sewell, 2011. *Women and the Everyday City: Public Space in San Francisco, 1890-1915*. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press.

This historian examines the lives of women in turn-of-the-century San Francisco. "During this period of transformation of both gender roles and American cities, [Sewell] shows how changes in the city affected women's ability to negotiate shifting gender norms as well as how women's increasing use of the city played a critical role in the campaign for women's suffrage." Drawing on diary accounts by three San Francisco women, Sewell details their everyday use of streetcars, shops, restaurants, and theaters. See drawing, p. 1.

Stephen Tyreman, 2011, ed. [special issue on "Homelikeness and Health"]. *Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy*, vol. 14.

Six articles by philosophers and medical practitioners that examine and criticize philosopher **Fredrik Svenaeus's** work on a phenomenology of illness that interprets illness as a rupture in the usualness of a person's lifeworld—what he calls an "unhomelike being-in-the-world." Article titles are "Homelikeness and Health: An Introduction to the Theme" (**S. Tyreman**); "Dwelling, House and Home: Towards a Home-Led Perspective on Dementia Care" (**W. Dekkers**); "The Happy Genius of my Household: Phenomenological and Poetic Journeys into Health and Illness" (**S. Tyreman**); "The Uncanny, Alienation and Stangeness: The Entwinning of Political and Medical Metaphor" (**A. Edgar**); "Illness and Unhomelike Being-in-the-World: Phenomenology and Medical Practice" (**R. Ahlžén**); and "Illness as Unhomelike Being-in-the-World: Heidegger and the Phenomenology of Medicine" (**F. Svenaeus**).

Doris Lessing, 1919–2013

British-African writer **Doris Lessing** died on November 17, 2013, at her home in north London. Though she never used the word “phenomenology” and probably cared little for what it might mean, she can readily be called an implicit phenomenologist who offered vivid word portraits of human experience and lifeworlds. In remembrance of her extraordinary work, we reproduce several vignettes relating to place and environmental experience.

Lessing's arriving in England in 1949 as a 26-year-old Southern Rhodesian emigrant:

I arrived in England exhausted. The white cliffs of Dover depressed me. They were too small. The Isle of Dogs discouraged me. The Thames looked dirty. I had better confess at once that for the whole of the first year, London seems to me a city of such appalling ugliness that I wanted only to leave... (*In Pursuit of the English*, NY: Popular Library, 1960, p. 32).

The freedom of the urban newcomer to be who she wishes to be:

For a few weeks, she had been anonymous, unnoticed—free. Coming to a big city for those who have never known one means first of all, before anything else, and the more surprising if one has not expected it, that freedom: all the pressures off, no one cares, no need for the mask. For weeks, then, without boundaries, without definition, like a balloon drifting and bobbing, nothing had been expected of her (*The Four-Gated City*, NY: Knopf, 1969, p. 4).

A long-time insider's intimacy with place:

Passing a patch of bared wall [because of World War II bombing] where the bricks showed a crumbling smear of mushroom colour, Iris was able to say: Mrs. Black painted this wall in 1938, it was ever such a nice pink. Or, looking up at a lit window, the curtains drawn across under the black smear of the blackout material which someone had not got around to taking down: Molly Smith bought those curtains down at the market the first year of the war, before things got so scarce. Or, walking around a block in the pavement, she muttered that the workmen never seemed to be able to get that piece in square, she always stubbed her toe against it.

Iris... had lived in this street since she was born. Put her brain together with the other million brains, women's brains, that recorded in such loving anxious detail the histories of window sills, skins of paint, replaced curtains and salvaged baulks of timber, there would be a recording instrument, a sort of six-dimensional map which included the histories and lives and loves of people, London—a section map in depth. This is where London exists, in the minds of people who have lived in such and such a street since they were born... (*The Four-Gated City*, p. 10).

An empathetic insider's encounter with place:

It was a wet evening, with a soft glistening light falling through a low golden sky. Dusk was gathering along walls, behind pillars and balustrades. The starlings squealed overhead. The buildings along Pall Mall seemed to float, reflecting soft blues and greens on to a wet and shining pavement. The fat buses, their scarlet softened, their hardness dissolved in mist, came rolling gently along beneath us, disembarking a race of creatures clad in light, with burnished hair and glittering clothes. It was a city of light I stood in, a city of bright phantoms (*In Pursuit of the English*, pp. 229–30).

The “heaviness” of an old woman's lifeworld:

Morning... oh, the difficulties of morning, of facing the day... each task such a weight to it... She sits there, thinking, I have to feed the cat... I have to... At last, she drags herself up, anxious, because her bowels are threatening again, and, holding on to door handles, chair backs, she gets herself into the kitchen. There is a tin of cat food, half empty. She tries to turn it on to a saucer, it won't come out. It means she has to get a spoon. A long way off, in the sink, are her spoons and forks, she hasn't washed up for days. She wrinkles out the cat food with her forefinger, her face wrinkled up—is it smelling perhaps? She lets the saucer fall from a small height on to the floor, for bending forward makes her faint. The cats sniffs at it and walks away, with a small miaow. Maudie sees that under the table are saucers, bone dry and empty. The cat needs milk, she needs water. Slowly, slowly, Maudie gets herself to the sink, pulls out of it a dirty saucer which she has not got the energy to wash, runs water into it. Finds a half bottle of milk. Has it gone off? She sniffs. No. She somehow gets the saucer on to the floor, holding on to the table and nearly falling. The cat drinks all the milk, and Maudie knows she is hungry.

Under the table not only the saucers, one, two, three, four, five, but a cat mess. This reminds Maudie she has to let the cat out. She toils to the door, lets out the cat and stands with her back to the door, thinking. A general planning a campaign could not use more cleverness than Maudie does, as she outwits her weakness and her terrible tiredness. She is already at the back door: the toilet is five steps away; if she goes now it will save a journey later. ... Maudie gets herself to the toilet, uses it, remembers there is the commode full of dirt and smell in her room, somehow gets herself along the passage to her room, somehow gets the pot out from under the round top, somehow gets herself and the pot to the toilet (*The Diaries of Jane Somers*, NY: Knopf, 1984, pp. 115–16).

Reflections on the Man Lying in the Highway

Paul Krafel

***Krafel** is a naturalist and educator who is Administrator of the Chrysalis Charter School in Palo Cedro, California, a teacher-led, kindergarten-through-eighth-grade, science-and-nature program. Chrysalis's mission is "encouraging the light within each student to shine brighter." Krafel is the author of *Seeing Nature* (Chelsea Green, 1998), which points toward a phenomenology of the two laws of thermodynamics, particularly the second law stating that all activities, left to their own devices, tend toward greater disorder and fewer possibilities. The following essay is reprinted, with permission, from Krafel's latest Cairns of Hope newsletter, available at: <http://www.chrysalischarterschool.com/Paul/Paul/Cairns/default.htm>. One can receive digital copies of the newsletter by making a request at: paul@chrysalischarterschool.com. © 2014 Paul Krafel.*

I was driving to kayaking when I saw what looked vaguely like a man lying in the left turn lane of the highway. The form had the right mass of a person but not the right proportions. As I drew nearer, I still could not make out what I saw.

I pulled off into the emergency lane and walked out into the highway. Even then I wasn't quite sure if the "pile of clothes" included a person. When I touched it, however, I realized the "it" was a man, curled up with a hood pulled over his head pillowed on a small bag, as if sleeping in the middle of the road.

He was probably in his mid-20s. No smell of alcohol or sign of injury. I tried to get him to stand up and get off the road, but he only grunted and rolled back into fetal position. As I tried to convince him to move, another car stopped. The driver called 911. A third car stopped and two women approached, one saying she was a doctor and asking if the man needed help.

In a few minutes, the police arrived. They helped the man up and out of the highway. One policeman asked questions that the man would not answer. The woman with the doctor tried signing to the man and he signed back. He was deaf, which changed the way the policeman related to him. An ambulance arrived and I drove on.

Three reflections from this experience stay with me. When I first looked at the man, I saw in his eyes a broken spirit. Every year, two or three children transfer to Chrysalis, the charter school I direct, because they were bullied at their former schools.

When I first meet these children, they all have a dull, pained look in their eyes. One of the joys of Chrysalis is watching the light come back over the first couple of weeks of school as the students realize that they are safe and that the other kids are kind.

But what if there wasn't a Chrysalis and you had to endure an entire childhood of bullying? And if you were deaf? And if you were from a background where you ended up on your own, homeless, deaf, and broken? Would you, too, reach a point where you would just lie down in the highway, curl up and cover your head until a car crushed you and ended the suffering?

The second reflection is about the man lying there. I was at a distance when I first noticed something. I did not see him walk out or lie down. He was already there in one lane of a double-left turn for a Walmart superstore and connected shopping mall. Drivers turning left could have gone around him by using the other turn lane. But that still would require them to notice a man lying in the street. How many minutes had he lain there? How many cars had driven by without stopping?

The third reflection is a sense of wonder about what happened when I did stop for the man. Within a minute, others also stopped, including the doctor and woman who could sign. How strange that the help he needed aligned in a few minutes! All I could do was to stop. That act, I think, led others to stop who *could* help him. The world can act in a heartless or charitable fashion. In some mysterious way, we help decide in which direction those actions will flow.

Lichens and the Cry of the Earth

Stephen Wood

Wood is an independent researcher in phenomenology and the environment. He studied systematic zoology at the University of Cambridge and has held an honorary fellowship in the Theoretical Physics Research Unit at Birkbeck College, London. This essay was written in 2008, after Wood's return from an Earth Jurisprudence course at Schumacher College in Totnes, England. At the time, he was living in Nîmes in the south of France. s.w.wood.88@cantab.net. © 2014 Stephen Wood.

November has been a rainy time here in Nîmes. Being unable to walk far, I was drawn to *Les Jardins de la Fontaine*, the city's public gardens. They are beautiful in any weather and have a particular calm about them. There the sacred spring of Nemausus can still be seen bubbling up from the earth. If you're lucky and the wind is in the right direction, you are protected from the noise of the city's traffic, and the trees of the garden envelop you with their stillness.

Leaving the spring, I started the climb toward the *Tour Magne*, the Gallo-Roman watchtower that presides over Nîmes. After the first flight of steps, I stopped at a stone wall beautifully clothed with lichens. The brilliant orange of *Xanthoria* lichens caught my eye, but after a while, I began to see lots of different shades of green, grey, blue, and white. All the lichens were of the encrusting type, closely hugging the wall, but some had the saucer-shaped cups of fruiting bodies.

As a boy, I was fascinated by this close symbiosis between two organisms, namely an alga and a fungus. Now, as I looked at the way the lichens worked their subtle magic on the stone, my enthusiasm was rekindled. It seemed these humble creatures were the natural growth of the wall, its breath and expansion. They were giving to our human construction a beauty and a harmony, a wisdom and a dignity of the kind that can only be acquired over centuries.

My eyes traced the tapestry of colors along the stone wall, feeling the lichens bringing the wall to life and blending it harmoniously with the landscape. But abruptly the lichens stopped and a message was sprayed in purple paint along the wall. There had also been plenty of snails on the wall, both a low-coiled and

a high-coiled species, but these too were now very much fewer in number.

Why did the lichens stop? The wall had been continued not as stone but as a bland, uniform slab of concrete. The lichens couldn't grow there. I read afterward that the lichens cannot tolerate the greater alkalinity of the concrete. Over time, the pH will change allowing the lichens to colonize. For now, however, I looked at the concrete and felt its pain. The life had gone out of the wall. It was now just filling space. What had happened to its voice, speaking to us of its dignified regard for the passing centuries? In a way, the material seemed dumb in its blandness and uniformity, "a dull, brutish beast." But I felt something else, too, coming from the concrete... It was as if the Earth lay there gagged in a silent scream.

Believing stone to be inert and lifeless, we have created inert and lifeless concrete. But the Earth suffers. Stone has a soul and, in concrete, we have taken it hostage. To me, it was no coincidence that the graffiti artist had vented his pain on the barren stretch of wall. Was he in his own way trying to bring a beauty and color to the wall, since the lichens could not? And isn't his graffiti the very emblem of the considerable alienation we have created through our modern world?

Rejoining the climb to the *Tour Magne*, I stopped at the frog pond. My friends, the three frogs I had seen regularly, had disappeared. The seasons had turned. The water lilies no longer sported their beautiful flowers and the water reeds looked dead. At the top, I sat for a while on the ruined Roman ramparts and contemplated the tower. My gaze shifted to an Aleppo pine, and I was delighted to see lichens sprouting thickly from the branches. I stood up to take a closer look and

spent a good few minutes enraptured by the miniature world created by these leafy lichens.

A few days earlier, I had been reading philosopher David Abram's *The Spell of the Sensuous*. As I walked down from the *Tour Magne* and back to my flat, I remembered how he describes the respect that the Plains Indians have for stones and rocks. When I returned home, I reread this beautiful ritual song of the Omaha (Abram, 1996, p. 71):

unmoved
from time without
end
you rest
there in the midst of the paths
in the midst of the winds
you rest
covered with the droppings of birds
grass growing from your feet
your head decked with the down of birds
you rest
in the midst of the winds
you wait
Aged one

One can picture the scene. There the rock sits, patient, humble, and wise. The wind whistles and feathers flutter past. Occasionally, a bird alights on the rock but flies off quickly, the stillness of the scene unbroken. As all around changes, the rock endures, a counterpoint, a resting place, a landmark. Let us come to rest and be taken by the rock's gentle rhythm, feeling a reverence for the slow aging ones of the Earth.

How our concrete walls are so robbed of feeling in comparison. Would we have created such a material at all, if we had these feelings of respect and reverence? Abram goes on to reflect on how true artists work with stone, indeed, any natural material. They work in cooperation with the material, to bring out its natural beauty, to enhance what is already there rather than impose their vision from without.

This is exactly the impression I have looking at Barbara Hepworth's sculptures—I come away a great fan of the stones and rocks themselves



and think, Wow! Where did she find such beautiful objects? Londoners have the chance to see the work of a wonderful stone sculptor—Emily Young's majestic, grave and compassionate angels that occupy the courtyard of St Paul's. Her angels emerge from the rock, messengers from the realm of the Earth, bearing their message of pain, of urgency, of dignity, and unity. Looking at her

website, I read how she only gradually became aware of the angels' message, only gradually became conscious of the cry of the Earth to which she was giving voice:

What is it that is happening when I carve stone? Many answers came, none the final one: but the best answer is—I am doing Nature's bidding. I am a part of Nature, and I am a manifestation in human form of her creativity; me carving stone is one of the infinite ways nature expresses itself. I am compelled by everything that I have ever experienced, or was born from, or know about, to do this, here, now... (Young, 2007)

In her latest piece, the Earth howls and unites with our howls of pain and loss, pain that begs to be met with compassion and tenderness:

This is the howl that we all have inside us. It's born of love, and loss. The howl comes with our birthright of experience and love. It was carved with an acknowledgement of human frailty in the face of death and loss and change. It's a monument to those who came and went before us, unmarked and unmourned, and for those in the future, who come after us, who will bear the dreadful repercussions of the profligacy and cruelty of our time.

After the howl, sometimes, there is quiet and peace, the grace even, that comes with the knowledge of how beautiful and complex are the people and places we loved, and lost, and are losing; and sometimes, possibly, gently, a surrender to the sense that we are here to serve the Earth, and the Earth's future... (Young, 2008)

Let us join in bringing the cry of the Earth to the awareness of the wider world!

References

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Traveling, Inhabiting, and Experiencing A Phenomenology for Public Transit

Lena Hopsch, Marco Cesario, and Rachel McCann

Hopsch is Senior Lecturer and researcher at Chalmers University of Technology, Department of Architecture in Theoretical and Applied Aesthetics, Gothenburg, Sweden. *Cesario* is a doctoral candidate in Philosophy at GERPHAU (Groupe d'études et de recherche philosophie, architecture et urbain), a unit of the Ecole Nationale Supérieure d'Architecture de Paris La Villette Université. *McCann* is an architect, architectural historian, and theorist. She is a Professor of Architecture at Mississippi State University in Starkville. hopsch@chalmers.se. © 2014 Lena Hopsch, Marco Cesario, and Rachel McCann.

In public transit, efficient movement and way finding are often at odds with human identity and environmental presence. Indeed, public transit often succeeds by transforming human beings into algorithms of movement and regarding their full humanity as a necessary sacrifice to efficiency. The design of transit environments often jettisons anything not instrumental to processing information about movement and orientation, including sensory engagement. Yet sensory engagement allows us to bond with a place and deepen our sense of orientation and safety.

It is through the sensory capacities of our body that we get to know the world and make sense of it, according to French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who explores the links between perception and meaning at length [1]. Current cognitive research also points to the importance of embodied experience for the formation of abstract concepts. For example, neurologist Antonio Damasio points to the significance of both imagination and emotions in order to make logical decisions and engage in abstract analysis [2]. In a related way, psychiatrist Ludwig Binswanger describes our orientation within subjective, situated space, supporting the phenomenological thoughts of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology [3]. Furthermore, the openness in Merleau-Ponty's system of "flesh" accommodates feminist psychoanalyst Luce Irigaray's account of pervasive human difference, incorporating a breadth of human expression and experience [4].

In this article, we explore how architecture supports a sense of safety and orientation by providing for rich sensory engagement. We describe three closely related phenomenological concepts that point to important design implications: first, *chiasm*, or intertwining, as the basis for creating a materially engaging architecture; second, a *spatiality of situation*, which draws meaning from embodied attunement to task and community; and, third, *alterity in the flesh*, a nuanced understanding of styles of spatial inhabitation.

We call on imagination and emotions when we experience architecture and urban space. In addition, our experiences and expectations color continually evolving perceptions inflected by gender and a myriad of differentiating human characteristics. Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology is a philosophy of sophisticated connection that answers to this complexity and depth. Understanding his concepts may assist architects in designing buildings that respond to human needs in a public setting.

To illustrate these possibilities, we present as a design example the Nils Ericson Terminal by Norwegian architect Niels Torp. Located in Gothenburg, Sweden, this terminal demonstrates how one might integrate social sustainability with architectural and material qualities to facilitate a powerful place ambience.

Bus Terminal as Agora

Borrowing partly from airport-terminal design, Torp rethinks what a bus terminal might be: a space for travelers and travelling but also an environment offering affordances to the activities of that place. Torp designs the

terminal building as an *agora*, with possibilities for movement and rest as well as for sociability. Small shops are situated along a narrow, skylit “street” stretching through the building and lined with cafés, eateries, and benches.



These small comforts—a warm, sunny path, places to sit and drink—are points of entry into a deeper level of engagement. These design elements provide rich, multisensory invitations through their material articulation. An architecture that speaks to all our senses is fundamental to our ability to construct a mental image of a building or place, since we remember a place more fully when our senses cooperate in perception [5]. A multisensory materiality taps into the depths of embodied experience, establishing a space as a place that we can connect to and thus experience as meaningful.

Merleau-Ponty posits subjects deeply intertwined with their worlds—an in-the-world-being where I exist with all my senses. He describes the human being as deeply at home in a milieu in which dichotomy between subject and object is replaced by interchange. In this milieu, the architect creates by engaging in careful acts of listening to possibilities for meeting human needs through material acts. As a result of the architect's care, a designed space may, through its materiality, become a giver-of-answers or a realm of possibilities for the user.

This situation can be called a *chiasmic opening* to the world. Merleau-Ponty's example of two hands touching illustrates chiasm, as one hand engages in actively touching the other while at the same time it passively receives the other's touch. An exchange, an answer of sorts, appears in what is close—in something that is the same yet different. Chiasm manifests as attentive dialogue with the world.

In designing the bus terminal, Torp does not regard architecture as an object. Rather, his starting point is focusing on the experience of traveling and travelers. The affordance of space is central in the building: Space is created as meaningful, and the choice of materials is essential. There is a sense of care in how materials are used, and Torp's skill with details is apparent. This at-

tention and expertise points toward what architect Juhani Pallasmaa defines as a responsibility to design for human existential needs alongside purely functional ones [6]. Similarly, architect Peter Zumthor identifies the link between materiality, meaning, and the architect's careful design: "Sense emerges when [the architect succeeds] in bringing out the specific meanings of certain materials ... in just this way in this one building" [7].

Phenomenology concerns itself with how something is experienced and lived. Merleau-Ponty insists that we are not separate from a world that is there before us, pre-given, whose materiality and spatiality inform our every thought pattern and action. Indeed, we are an integral, inseparable part of what Merleau-Ponty calls the *flesh*, an overarching, interactive milieu in which "each perception implies a certain perception of the body ... due to the body's ability to feel itself as it can also feel other objects" [8]. Merleau-Ponty's notion of the chiasm describes how to enter the realm of relations—with oneself, with others, and with material things. We can use the idea of chiasm to conceptually reformulate spaces for urban transport as we focus on human sensory experience. In this way, we incorporate French poet Paul Valéry's observation that "the artist takes his body with him" [9].

The Nils Ericson Terminal extends from the Gothenburg Central Station, a building with a high ceiling that feels gloomy—almost hostile with its hard, clashing sounds. When we move from the central station to the new terminal, we pass a palpable border. The first shift we notice is a change in sounds that seem suddenly muffled. People seem to move more slowly. On this particular spring morning, light filters into the building. Like a tree canopy, the arched roof sparks an interplay between light and shadow. To access bus platforms, one passes through transparent glass walls enframing heavy oak doors. The space seems open and protectively enclosing. Its colors shift from moment to moment and season to season—from steel gray winter light to the shimmering gold of a summer's night.

A unique ambience pervades the terminal. People of all sorts sit together on the U-shaped waiting benches that form a room within a room: a homeless woman and her bags; a man in formal suit; teenagers

laughing, gesticulating, and "plugged into" their electronic devices. More teens sit on the floor in the slanting sunlight; one boy charges his mobile phone. This scene resembles a living room where the personal, individual sphere is transplanted into the shared public realm.

Chiasm—a reversible interconnectedness with materiality—offers a fecund condition for artistic creation. It involves pointed, intensified, sensuous attention to things along with an attitude of participation [10]. The chiasmic attitude intertwines perception and language, emotion and intellect, body and world [11]. Pallasmaa describes how architects internalize a building bodily, feeling it in their muscles and joints [12]. He highlights Henry Moore's contention that the sculptor "thinks ... of the solid shape as if he were holding it completely enclosed in the hollow of his hand [and] mentally identifies ... with its center of gravity, its mass, its weight" [13].

In the Nils Ericson Terminal, Torp directs his gaze toward what it is to travel and to be an everyday commuter. While we wait for a bus, our senses are stimulated by the building's light, greenery, materials; its sensitively chosen scale; its well crafted details; and its enticing smells from eateries and cafés. Our minds wander among the sensory delights, and an interchange—a chiasm—takes place as our receptive senses engage us within a meaningful place for travel through new experiences that are at once stimulating and comforting.

A Spatiality of Situation

In the modernist paradigm, the body is often considered as a mere object topographically located in a determinate position within objective space. As Merleau-Ponty explains, however, the body's movement in space is intrinsically connected with the experiences of duration, energy, and movement. As he explores the primordial spatiality of the lived body and its original intentionality, he also discloses the fundamental carnal and affective relations between the body and space [14].

Merleau-Ponty's work corroborates that of Swiss psychiatrist Ludwig Binswanger, who details the role of bodily identification and orientation in space, contrasting the homogeneous and objective space of science with the subjective, "attuned" space of human experience. According to Binswanger, space and time are constantly and subjectively assumed by the body. Space is inside the subject; consciousness is itself spatial. There

is not one space and time but as many spaces and temporal moments as there are subjects [15].

Instead of a *spatiality of position*, the perceptual experience of our lived body engenders a *spatiality of situation*—the situation of the body in the face of daily activities. Bodily and external space form a system, the former being the background against which objects as goals of our actions “come to light” and disclose themselves. Through action and movement, our body is “brought into being.” When we analyze the body in motion, we understand how it inhabits space because movement is not strictly submitted to space and time; rather, it assumes them through a here-and-now synthesis.

When performing, dancers experience an expanded sense of time because their temporal consciousness is modified by the “arc” of the body’s movement in relation to an environment of music, stage, other dancers, and audience. In this context—and in every architectural context—communication between the body and the world takes place through a *praktognosia*, a direct, practical knowledge of the world [16]. In the face of concrete, spatial situations, the body’s posture and movements assume multiple tasks and act in oriented spaces integrated with time. Bodily intention creates a space-time structure of here-and-now.

In today’s culture, we are regularly surrounded by architecture and immersed within an architectural context. Our architectural environments open spatial experiences and enlarge consciousness by exploiting the body’s kinaesthetic possibilities. The architectural context suggests possibilities for movement that absorb and engage the user, opening up a perceptive experience engaging all our senses. In Torp’s bus terminal, entries, windows, stairs, and waiting spaces stir imaginative and physical movement. The body experiences not only distance, length, and depth, but also a wider sense of movement arising from the whole building. Many contemporary buildings contain a slow, hidden movement of the entire structure, combining their elements to create a sense of direction and moving structure.

In any situation, one recognizes that consciousness extends beyond the present moment to incorporate past and future. The simple daily commute, for

example, is a situated moment in time in which people leave temporal traces in an always changing configuration. The journey from point A to point B is not simply a trip’s beginning and end, just as a book’s front and back covers do not represent its physical limits but work as “gates” to enter its less visible contents. The journey resides in what “remains and sediments” in the middle. This openness can be explored through spaces allowing an exchange of contents, interaction, and participation. The creation of a “choreographic” space in underground stations allows users to interact with other users, situations, and architectural events [17].

In envisioning the Nils Ericson Terminal, Torp perhaps took this approach, designing for both an individual *and* collective experience in shared public space. When the building received the Kasper Sahlin prize for architecture in 1996, the jury commended Torp’s “desire to lift everyday life and celebrate the common force that allows our society to function so well” [18]. The station transforms the experience of a mundane daily commute into something pleasurable, framing the simple bus ride with a sense of respect for *the act of traveling*.

The architect should consider the experience of space beyond a geometric perspective. To be fully understood by the body, spatial experience should be global, including all aspects of the senses. Architects often design and plan spatial configurations without knowing whether they fit real patterns of human behavior. Sculptures, pictures, videos, and art can transform the quality of these spaces. Instead of conceiving space for public transit as simple crossing points, one can envision a sublimated, transformed landscape.

The notion of *agora* is a collective experience to share with others, a meaningful superstructure that places human beings in a context in which they emerge attuned to a particular time-space situation. Reconceiving a transit station as an agora has strong social impact, layering a public sphere of potential human interchanges onto the often depersonalizing act of getting quickly from place to place. From this perspective, *agora* can represent a space in which people become nodes in a serendipitous, interconnected place structure. The bus station as agora introduces a different kind of communication among human beings: each individual is

both a single communication node linked with the community and also an immersed member in a global communication “cloud” in touch with the individual nodes.

***Difference*’ and Public Transit**

In one way, public transit is the great social leveler. It strips away luxury devices and many markers of social status, making each traveler an equal participant. On the other hand, travelers’ styles of being commingle. Some stride purposefully and with confidence, focused solely on the goal of arriving somewhere. Some amble, giving their children time and space to play and explore along the way. Some dream, walking slowly and barely there, caught up in thoughts or sounds in headphones. Some walk with a dejected air, carrying invisible weights that muffle enjoyment of surrounding spaces and people. In short, each person engages physical surroundings differently. When we enter a place with the sole purpose of getting ourselves elsewhere, we tend to reduce ourselves, other people, and the place to either moving points or a channel for those points.

A space for mass transit reveals postmodern society’s unwitting retention of a Cartesian system that alienates us from the surrounding world and from other people. Within this system, we cast the world purely as “other,” leaving no means for it to be rehabilitated into the relational sphere. In contrast, by constructing a singular norm for humanity, with women as mere variants of men (which Luce Irigaray calls variants of the self-same) and a failure to acknowledge different ethnicities, sexual orientations, and social backgrounds, we fail to give other expressions of humanity the breadth of expression they require [19].

Although the postmodern perspective acknowledges social plurality, its relation to human others and the material world is formed largely within a posture of alienation. Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the flesh offers new possibilities for engaging alterity. Configuring existence as a relational process of self-discovery through interrogative acts of perception, the flesh immerses us in a world where encountering people and things constantly reconfigures our own terrain [20]. In our spatial encounters, the perceived environment accommodates our pragmatic

goals while beckoning us to wonder. In our personal encounters, others present new ideas and perspectives that corroborate or challenge us.

Merleau-Ponty’s flesh allows nuanced engagement of similarity and difference, kinship and alterity. We give up our position as a solitary *cogito* to take our place as a thing among things, yet perceived things still present us with ambiguities and draw us into mystery. We experience deep communality with other people but retain divergent desires and positions. In encountering divergent others, Merleau-Ponty observes that our “distance becomes a strange proximity” when we understand the shared nature of the perceptual world. In this shared environment, we combine multiple viewpoints to arrive at a collaborative understanding of things and social constructs, reaching consensus that is respectful of difference [21].

Responding to the full depths of the human capacity to transform through relationship opens a range of possibilities for mass-transit design. Designers can foster human engagement with the material and spatial environment through attention to multi-sensory experience, perceptual shifts due to movement (changing both viewing angle and viewing distance), common materiality (psychological understanding of the weight of materials alongside physical transfers such as heat exchange), and sensuous invitations to touch and wonder. Designers can accommodate the breadth of human expression by allowing for experiential variations. Simple efforts like accommodation in ability (motility, sight, hearing, skin sensitivity) or responsibility (for children, pets, suitcases, or packages) encourage this breadth of expression and a shared environment. Torp’s Nils Ericson Terminal incorporates many features that encourage sensory and social engagement—for example, bright colors; warm materials and lights; staggered or layered geometry; rhythmic ceiling planes; and zones of use, including small commercial kiosks and sheltered sitting areas.

Too often, mass-transit spaces reduce the human body to a point moving toward a destination and a passive set of eyes for moneyed advertising interests. In contrast, good design can restore a fuller sense of our humanity by welcoming the individual human body and different human psyches within a larger shared space. By combining attention to human needs with attunement to embodiment, design fosters awareness of human difference while recognizing the carnal kinship of

the material and spatial surround. One recognizes an ethics of embodiment accommodating complex nuances of sameness and difference.

Through careful spatial inquiry, the architect can understand and reveal the hidden supports of spatial experience (proportion, light, rhythm, texture) and use them to evoke a sense of spatial wonder that unmoors inhabitants from unreflective, habitual experience—taking spatial and social experience out of the ordinary. These spatial moves encourage people to question “universal” norms of inhabiting and sharing space. These design efforts range from creatively combining social services and upscale amenities to sculptural interventions that reframe perceptions of strangers. Spatial intentions such as transparency and layering can partner with social intentions of equality, multiplicity, orientation, safety, and comfort. Foregrounding materiality evokes our kinship with the sensuous world and sustains our full humanity. Allowing for human multiplicity reminds us that there are many valid variants of human expression. Even in a space designed for efficient mass transit, the architect can encourage real encounter with human others and the material world.

A Supportive, Meaningful Space

Using a phenomenological approach, architects and urban planners can design public places that are both efficient and humane. Drawing on sensory experience, a chiasmic attitude helps one to enter the realm of relations—with oneself, with others, and with material things. We can use the idea of chiasm to conceptually reformulate spaces for urban transport as we focus on human sensory experience.

The Nils Ericson Terminal is a good example of how the expressiveness and the emotive qualities of the chosen materials help to create a supportive, meaningful space. Furthermore, a bus terminal is a social space for interaction, participation, and exchange with others, and it should respond to a “spatiality of situation” while accommodating different styles of being. Torp’s design admirably provides this range of sociability. The Nils Ericson Terminal powerfully demonstrates how we might design architectural space that encourages users to engage fully

with a sustaining ambience grounded in material, architectural qualities.

Notes

1. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*. London: Routledge, 2002.
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4. L. Irigaray, *An Ethics of Sexual Difference*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993.
5. Damasio (note 2).
6. J. Pallasmaa, *The Eyes of the Skin*, London: Academy Press, 1999, p. 10.
7. P. Zumthor, *Thinking Architecture*, Basel: Birkhäuser, 1998, p. 10.
8. H. Dahlberg, *Vikten av kropp, frågan om kött och människa i Maurice Merleau-Pontys Le visible et l'invisible*. Diss. Göteborg: Göteborgs universitet, 2011, p. 55 [Hopsch’s translation].
9. M. Merleau-Ponty, “Eye and Mind,” in *The Primacy of Perception*. Evanston, Illinois: North Western Univ. Press, 1964, p. 162.
10. A. Pérez-Gómez, “The Space of Architecture,” in S. Holl, J. Pallasmaa, & A. Pérez-Gómez, eds., *Questions of Perception: Phenomenology of Architecture*. San Francisco: William Stout, 2006, p. 13.
11. H. Dahlberg, 2011, p. 101 & 60 [note 6] [Hopsch’s translation].
12. J. Pallasmaa, “An Architecture of the Seven Senses,” in ed. S. Holl, J. Pallasmaa, A. Pérez-Gómez, *Questions of Perception, Phenomenology of Architecture*, San Francisco: William Stout, 2006, p. 36.
13. H. Moore, *Henry Moore on Sculpture*, London: Macdonald, 1966, pp. 62–64.
14. Merleau-Ponty, 2002 [note 1].
15. Binswanger, 1998, p. 133 [note 3].
16. A. Berthoz, *The Brain’s Sense of Movement*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 2000, p. 25.
17. F. Pouillade, “*De l'espace chorégraphique: entre extase et discrétion*,” *Philosophie* n.93, Éditions de Minuit 2007.
18. Hopsch’s translation from the Swedish.
19. Irigaray, 1993, p. 156, 167, 171–72, 178 [note 4].
20. M. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962, p. 241; M. Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1968, p. 152, 140, 142, 259.
21. M. Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1964, p. 15.

Photographs, p. 10: Photograph of building exterior by Hans Wretling and used with permission; photograph of building interior drawn from: www.arskortguldsgj.wordpress.com/category/buss/page/2/.

Rethinking Dwelling

Heidegger and the Question of Place

Jeff Malpas

Malpas is a Distinguished Professor at the University of Tasmania where he works across programs in Architecture, Geography, and Philosophy. Two of his most recent volumes are Heidegger and Thoughts on Place (MIT Press, 2012); and his edited collection, The Place of Landscape (MIT Press, 2011). The following essay was originally a lecture given at the University of Auckland's School of Architecture in May, 2012, and then published in 2013 as Rethinking Dwelling: Heidegger and the Question of Place (Auckland, Aotearoa/New Zealand: Interstices|matariki editions; ISBN 978-0-473-26924-1). We thank Ross Jenner and Tina Engles-Schwarzpaul for permission to reprint Malpas's essay. Jeff.Malpas@utas.edu.au. © 2014 Jeff Malpas.

Building Dwelling Thinking' (*Bauen Wohnen Denken*) is a lecture that German philosopher Martin Heidegger gave in 1951 to a symposium of architects and others on the general topic of 'Man and Space' [1]. In that lecture, Heidegger explores an idea that appears elsewhere in his thinking—the concept of what is usually rendered in English as 'dwelling' (*Wohnen*). Heidegger asks after the nature of dwelling and the extent to which building (*Bauen*) belongs to dwelling.

In this lecture, one of Heidegger's claims is that "Only if we are capable of dwelling, only then can we build" [2]. Building is thus seen as consequent on the possibility of human dwelling. Heidegger's discussion of dwelling has relevance that goes well beyond architectural and design practice. His sense of 'building' refers not only to architectural construction but to the whole range of human productive activity. Nevertheless, the essay does have a special resonance for architects, and this is partly because it includes one of Heidegger's most sustained discussions of the concepts of space and place.

The idea of dwelling that figures so prominently in the lecture has been taken up within architectural theory by a number of writers, but perhaps most famously by Norwegian architectural theorist Christian Norberg-Schulz [3]. It is partly his influence, along with that of other writers such as architectural theorist Kenneth Frampton, that lies behind the prominence that Heidegger has had within architectural theory. Norberg-Schulz takes dwelling as a guiding concept

for architectural practice. He suggests that dwelling is indicative of a mode of practice attentive to the human and the environmental context of architectural design and therefore conducive to a genuine relation to place.

There is much that is important in Norberg-Schulz, but there are also problematic features in the way in which he takes up the notion of dwelling. I tend to think that so problematic are some of the ideas associated with the notion of dwelling, as understood in Norberg-Schulz's work and elsewhere, that it has become a sort of devalued currency, and that, in many cases, it has actually become a barrier to thinking more adequately about place and the human relation to place. Perhaps it has become a barrier to thinking more adequately about late Heidegger also.

It might be argued that the concept of dwelling actually picks up on an absolutely central element in Heidegger's work, and that therefore it cannot reasonably be abandoned, no matter how devalued it may have become. Certainly, the way Norberg-Schulz takes up the idea of dwelling and the way the notion may be thought to appear in 'Building Dwelling Thinking' is continuous with a set of concerns present in Heidegger's earlier thinking—the thinking present in *Being and Time*—no less than in his later work.

These concerns are closely tied to ideas of 'belonging', 'identity', and especially 'authenticity' (*Eigentlichkeit*). The last is often taken to be central in Heidegger's earlier work. 'Dwelling' (which does appear briefly in *Being and Time* as well, although it is not

much developed) might be viewed as a development out of the idea of ‘authentic existence’, so that what it is to live an authentic life comes to be seen to be identical with what it is to dwell.

What this actually suggests, however, is that the critical engagement with the concept of dwelling cannot be restricted to Heidegger’s later work but also requires a rethinking of aspects of the earlier. Any critique of the concept of dwelling cannot be restricted to that concept alone but needs to extend to concepts like authenticity, identity, and belonging.

The broader engagement presaged here is exactly what I intend to embark upon in this talk. I also discuss what I have elsewhere referred to as Heidegger’s ‘topology’, since I will address, in general terms, the question of place—*topos*—in Heidegger’s thinking [4].

As with dwelling, the question of place not only relates to Heidegger’s later thought. One of the things that happens in Heidegger’s philosophical development from early to late and that is centrally at issue in the move toward the focus on dwelling, is a shift toward a more explicit concern with issues of ‘space’ and, especially, of ‘place’.

Indeed, the very idea of dwelling inevitably suggests an essentially topological mode of understanding. As I noted earlier, one reason why ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’ can be seen as relevant reading for architects and designers is its explicit thematization of just these issues. But the earlier thinking is just as topological and spatially rich as Heidegger’s later thinking. The difference is that the earlier work is simply not as clear about these matters as the later [5].

It is not that *Being and Time* lacks a topological focus, but that it lacks a proper understanding of that focus and of its topological character. There is a topology in both early and late Heidegger but, in early work, it remains largely implicit. Part of what occurs over the course of Heidegger’s thinking is the increasing explication and articulation of this topology.

The issue of dwelling is closely tied to the thinking through of what might be involved in such a topology. Equally, getting clear about the topology also means getting clear about what might be at issue in dwelling as well as in belonging and identity. Moreo-

ver, this clarification is essential to any genuine thinking or rethinking of place, including any inquiry into its role in architectural theory and practice.

Inasmuch as my aim here is to undertake such rethinking within a specifically Heideggerian context, so much of this rethinking means not only returning to Heidegger anew but also returning to the conceptual and philosophical issues Heidegger’s thinking presents. My apologies in advance, then, for presenting a talk in an architecture school that will make little or no reference to concrete architectural materials. My aim, however, is to inquire into a set of ideas that has been influential for architecture at a foundational level. My hope is to provide a way of rethinking those ideas so that they can be influential again, but in a very different way.

The Suspicion of Place

One might say that I am getting ahead of myself—that before we embark on any ‘rethinking’, whether of ‘dwelling’ or anything else, we need to know why such rethinking is needed. What, we might ask, is wrong with the idea of dwelling as it is deployed in writers such as Norberg-Schulz? The best way to approach this issue, especially in an architectural context, is through the larger question of place with which the issue of dwelling is so closely connected.

Place, as well as space, is surely central to architecture—or at least so one might think. Yet not only is it contentious as to what might be meant by talk of ‘place’, but the fact is that place has only sometimes been taken up in any direct way by architects.

If one looks, for instance, to much of contemporary architecture (although there are some important exceptions), it would seem as if place is often disregarded, with buildings frequently appearing as more or less autonomous in relation to their topographical surrounds. Moreover, there is also a widespread tendency—one that extends well beyond architecture—to view the very concept of place with suspicion. Nowhere is this suspicion more evident than in attitudes toward the concept of place—and with it dwelling—as it appears in the work of the later Heidegger.

In Norberg-Schulz’s work, however, place appears as a positive, benign notion. Place is that within which we dwell, within which we are at home. To dwell is to be located in a harmonious relationship with one’s surrounding environment. Norberg-Schulz’s valorization

of place and dwelling is based in the idea that our dwelling in place grants us an identity and a meaning that we would otherwise lack. We find ourselves in place and to dwell is to have found a proper sense of oneself and a *sense of belonging*.

Dwelling is thus an antidote to a modernity in which we otherwise risk losing any sense of identity, self, or meaning. It is, however, just this focus on identify, self, and meaning, and especially the way these concepts seem articulated in relation to place and dwelling, that become a source of difficulty.

Place may be a means to ground identity, but the way it does this, so it is often claimed, is deeply problematic. According to a very common way of approaching the matter, place is an essentially deterministic, exclusionary, and nostalgic concept. The identity of place is thus *determinate*—a fixed identity into which we ourselves are also fixed. Being rooted *in place*, that identity is also taken to be rooted *in the past* and involves an essentially *backward-looking* orientation that prevents a genuine engagement with the future.

Inasmuch as that identity is based in our belonging within the *bounds* of place, it leads us to *exclude* others from that place as the means to affirm that identity. As that identity is determined by the place, so our own identity takes on a *determinacy* that lies outside our control. The concept of dwelling appears to depend on the concept of place, since we must always dwell *somewhere*. If, then, place is an essentially deterministic, exclusionary, and nostalgic concept, dwelling must be too, and this is just what many critics of the appeal to dwelling, from within architecture as well as outside, would claim [6].

Much of the argument for the problematic character of place and dwelling is based on historical or biographical evidence supposedly connecting place to reactionary politics. Nazism is often taken as the paradigmatic example—Heidegger’s involvement usually given to reinforce the connection, both in his own case and more generally.

Significantly, however, the assertion of the connection at stake here often depends on a fairly selective attentiveness to historical or biographical detail. Thus, appeals to place operating within progressive politics (and there certainly are such) are ignored or

seen as already demonstrating the less-than-progressive nature of such politics, while tendencies within reactionary politics that are antagonistic to place (including forms of nationalism, authoritarianism, and centralism) are overlooked.

In Heidegger’s case, there is little account taken, for instance, of the fact that the increasingly explicit appearance of ideas of place occurs after his involvement with Nazism and actually seems to figure as a key element in his critique of the nihilistic subjectivism that he takes Nazism to exemplify. At the same time, Heidegger’s emphasis on time’s priority over space in the earlier work and the apparent absence in that work of any developed notion of place tends to be ignored. In these respects, the problematic character of place often seems to be something assumed rather than argued. It often seems simply to be taken for granted that place is politically problematic.

Yet one might contend there is an argument behind the tendency to read place in this way, and in some cases that argument is made explicit. Philosopher Emmanuel Levinas, for instance, claims that the attachment to place, which Levinas sees as exemplified by Heidegger’s thought, entails both a *separation* of oneself from others (through the erecting of a boundary between those who belong and do not belong to ‘this’ place) coupled with a turning away from the other through the focus *on the place* rather than on the other who appears within that place—so one’s attention is turned to the surrounding horizon, as it were, rather than to the face that is immediately before one [7].

In direct contrast to Heidegger, Levinas extols technology precisely because of its displacing character—because it frees us from the ‘superstitions’ of place, allowing us “to perceive men outside the situation in which they are placed, and let the human face shine in all its nudity” [8].

As Levinas sees it, the association of place with reactionary politics is underpinned by the character of place itself—place is always exclusionary, operating against any genuine sense of engagement with the human—and thus must stand opposed to any progressive politics and also to any genuine ethics.

Although seldom explicitly invoked in any detailed way, Levinas’s argument seems to underlie the view of place as a problematic, reactionary concept. Like many others, Levinas sees this as evidence for the problematic

character of Heidegger's thinking, especially the later thinking—and in this manner the argument could also be extended to Norberg-Schulz.

For some readers of Heidegger, however, Norberg-Schulz's position must be set apart from Heidegger's. Also, Heidegger's position must be set apart from Levinas's problematic reading of place. Thus, Italian philosopher Massimo Cacciari accepts much of Levinas's place critique but does not accept this as the basis for a critique of Heidegger. In contrast, Cacciari reads Heidegger as critical of the concept of place at issue, especially as it appears in Norberg-Schulz's work, taking it to be a concept that is inadequate to our contemporary situation.

Consequently, Cacciari argues against what he views as the 'nostalgia' present in Norberg-Schulz: "No nostalgia, then, in Heidegger—but rather the contrary. [Heidegger] radicalizes the discourse supporting any possible 'nostalgic' attitude, lays bare its logic, pitilessly emphasizes its insurmountable distance from the actual condition" [9].

I have some sympathy with Cacciari's position (although I would not use 'nostalgia' to name the issue that is at the heart of things). What Cacciari emphasizes—the radicality of Heidegger's approach and its own critical, questioning stance—is also central to the account I offer here [10].

Place, Difference, & Identity

Much of the argument for the problematic character of place and dwelling is based in the association of place with a particular way of understanding identity and belonging. These notions are taken to stand against any notion of difference.

Identity, on this account, is precisely that which excludes difference. Inasmuch as they are associated with notions of place and dwelling, so these latter notions are seen as similarly exclusionary. Yet this way of understanding identity and belonging is surely not beyond question. If we accept a connection between identity and place, then we can surely ask after the sense of identity that is at issue here, and whether the connection to place might not require a rethought conception of identity. In fact, when we look to Heidegger's work, the question of identity and the re-

thinking of identity is a central issue—one that he examined at length in one of his most important later essays—'The Principle of identity' from 1957 [11].

In that essay, Heidegger takes identity, or sameness, as a "belonging together." But he points to a difference between the understanding of such belonging in a way that emphasizes the *belonging* or the *together*. If we think of identity as a "belonging together," then we give emphasis to the unity of the together over the belonging. In other words, we give emphasis to the unity of that which belongs.

On the other hand, if we think of identity as a "*belonging together*", then we emphasize the belonging—the relation between—that allows for the unity of the together. Heidegger takes the first of these ways of thinking to be the more usual and as underpinning a metaphysical or 'representational' approach according to which belonging is grounded in the unity of that which belongs. On this approach, identity, the self—sameness of the being of the thing, is grounded in the thing understood, one might say, 'autonomously'.

The second way of thinking, however, moves us away from the thing understood in such an autonomous fashion and toward the thing as already placed *in relation*. The belonging together of the thing with itself is not a matter of the simple self-sameness of the thing taken alone but is rather a *belonging together* of being and thing. Identity thus appears as *relational*—and as relational, so the identity of the thing is also essentially tied to *difference*.

Such a way of understanding identity is markedly different from the approaches to identity common within the Western philosophical tradition in which identity—and with it unity also (for the two concepts are closely related)—is often taken to be paradigmatically understood on the model of *numerical* unity, and so as exclusive of any difference and as apart from that which is different.

As Heidegger presents the situation, being cannot be said to be founded *in* identity (in the self-sameness of the thing). Instead, identity stands under the sway of the *belonging together* of being *and* thing—and of being and the human—in which each is *appropriated* to the other. It is this belonging together that allows for both identity and for difference.

It is worth emphasizing just how different this way of thinking is from our usual understanding of identity.

Typically, we think of identity as directing us to the thing as it stands apart from other things in its own self-same nature. This sense of identity has a founding role in metaphysical thinking—being is understood as itself founded in the idea of the thing in its self-identity—in its autonomous self-sameness.

Heidegger's account displaces identity from this founding role as it also displaces the understanding of identity. As Heidegger presents the situation, identity is never just a matter of the self-sameness of the thing but always directs us toward the thing in its relationality—to the thing as it both *gathers* and is itself *gathered*. In this way, identity is determined *by being* rather than that which determines or founds *being* (though it should be noted that being appears here in a way such that it is itself tied to relationality).

Understanding identity—and so also unity (since the two are closely tied together)—in this way means understanding identity as dynamic—that is, as something constantly being worked out, *and* as encompassing an essential difference and differentiation. Moreover, the difference at issue here is not the difference of two self-same entities already standing apart from one another, but a difference that itself arises only in and through an essential relatedness.

It is this event of gathering—which is also a belonging, a unifying, and a differentiating—that Heidegger connects directly to ‘the event of appropriation’ (to use the phrase employed in the English version of ‘The Principle of Identity’)—the *Ereignis*—that is such a central notion in his later thinking [12]. Of this event, in which both being and the human are appropriated each to the other, Heidegger writes that it “is that realm, vibrating within itself, through which man and being reach each other in their nature”—making clear that this event is indeed a realm, a bounded domain, a *topos*, rather than purely and exclusively temporal.

Heidegger's understanding of identity as both dynamic and relational—and as itself *topological*—is not only evident in his explicit discussion of identity in his 1957 essay but is evident throughout his thinking, especially his later thinking.

If we turn back to ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’, for instance, then the way Heidegger develops the idea of the Fourfold as the unitary gathering of earth, sky, mortals, and gods makes very clear that not only

is this unity itself articulated through the differentiated character of its elements, and so encompasses an essential multiplicity, but those elements are themselves constituted only through their being gathered within the ‘Onefold’ of the Four.

What is at issue is the same ‘event’ of appropriation, though explicated differently and in a more explicitly topological fashion, as that which is invoked in ‘The Principle of Identity’. It is also the same ‘event’ that is instantiated, in a slightly different way again, in the Heideggerian notion of the *Lichtung*—the ‘lighting’ or ‘clearing’—that is, the event of truth that Heidegger explores across a number of different works over the course of his career [13].

If we return here from the question of identity to the question of being itself, then what becomes evident is that, just as being is not determined or founded in the self-same identity of the thing, in the thing understood as somehow univocally self-determinate, so being must itself be understood through this same appropriative ‘event’ or ‘realm’—through this same topology.

The question of identity is not merely a peripheral issue in Heidegger's thought. Instead, it is a question that lies close to its very heart. Indeed, in the introduction to *Identity and Difference*—the volume in which ‘The Principle of Identity’ appears—translator Joan Stambaugh writes that “it came as no surprise ... when Heidegger stated that he considered *Identity and Difference* to be the most important thing he has published since *Being and Time*” [14].

The question of identity is central to Heidegger's thought and a central philosophical problem more generally. Moreover, Heidegger contests the conventional understanding of identity in a way directly tied to his thinking of the question of being and to the topological frame within which that thinking proceeds.

It is all the more striking, then, to find Heidegger so often read—by those who are sympathetic as well as antagonistic—in ways that take for granted a conventional understanding of identity, thereby attributing to Heidegger a view of identity that he explicitly eschews.

Heidegger's emphasis on identity as founded in appropriation and so as standing in an essential relation to difference and relationality, as unity is also tied to multiplicity, reflects the character of place as both bounded *and* open, as both singular *and* plural.

Indeed, one might argue that one of Heidegger's most important insights is the recognition that the world opens up only in and through the bounded singularity of place. This is why the question of being must always begin with the question of the *Da*—the here/there—a *Da* that cannot be simply identified with the human even though it also implicates the human (where the 'human' is simply another name for mortals—those for whom their own being is an issue).

This means, however, that, rather than being tied to a problematic notion of identity as determinate and exclusionary, the notion of place provides the proper antidote to such a notion. Rather than thinking of place in terms of identity, identity must be rethought in terms of place itself—which means in terms of place in all its complexity as well as its simplicity.

It is not place that is the problem but, rather, the inadequate thinking of place—a thinking that turns out also to be inadequate to identity, which, as Heidegger makes clear, is not a notion to be abandoned. Without identity, there is no difference just as, without difference, there is no identity but, rather, a notion to be rethought. The rethinking required here expands to a rethinking of those other key notions, including belonging and dwelling—that are so often invoked by writers like Norberg-Schulz.

Place and Questioning

One of the great virtues of Massimo Cacciari's reading of Heidegger is its emphasis on the genuinely questioning and critical character of Heidegger's thought. Cacciari does not commit Heidegger to inconsistency by assuming a conventional understanding of identity that then turns out to be at odds with other aspects of his thinking or that is incompatible with a more critical mode of engagement.

Heidegger himself emphasizes the centrality of questioning and questionability, and this centrality remains even after Heidegger qualifies his emphasis on questioning as 'the piety of thought' [15] by insisting that it is listening that retains priority [16].

To listen is already to find oneself in a state of openness that is part of any genuine attitude of questioning—so long, that is, as one understands questioning not as some form of inquisition but rather as a mode, essentially, of receptivity. Again, this has a top-

ological inflection, for such questioning listening already brings with it the idea of singular situatedness—an orientation within and toward—that is the necessary condition for anything to approach us, to come near us, for anything even to be heard.

Moreover, the topology that emerges here is not the result of some entrenched metaphorical predilection or habit but is a reflection of the fundamentally topological character of thinking and appearing [17].

Although recognizing the extent to which Heidegger has to be read as taking a stance against philosophical conventionalities, Cacciari nevertheless shares some of the conventional assumptions concerning the idea of place and related notions such as belonging and dwelling. Like Norberg-Schulz and Levinas, Cacciari seems to treat these notions as tied to the idea of a mode of being that supposedly privileges the sedentary, secure, and familiar.

From this perspective, place still appears as an essentially deterministic, exclusionary, and 'nostalgic' concept. Cacciari's claim that there is no nostalgia in Heidegger can be read, not as directed toward the retrieval of an alternative conception of place, but rather as part of an argument to the effect that it is this very notion of place—and with it notions of belonging and dwelling—that is no longer available to us as a viable option for thinking or living.

On Cacciari's reading, then, Heidegger urges us to face up to the placelessness of modernity as our inevitable condition.

Yet just as one cannot afford to assume a conventional understanding of identity in Heidegger, neither can one assume a conventional understanding of place or the concepts connected with it. The questioning so central to Heidegger's thinking extends to a questioning of place itself, and of what it might mean to reside, to dwell, or even to belong. 'Building Dwelling Thinking' is directed at just such a rethinking—explicitly so, since it begins with the questions 'What is dwelling?' ('*Was ist das Wohnen?*') and 'How far does building belong to dwelling?'

The nature of these questions is clearer in German than in English, since the English translation of *Wohnen* as 'dwelling' obscures the fact that the focus of Heidegger's question is not some strange or exceptional mode of being, but rather something completely ordinary. When one asks, in German, 'Where do you live?'

one says ‘*Wo wohnen Sie?*’ Here, one is not invoking anything beyond what one invokes with the same question in English. *Wohnen*, in German, is a commonplace term in a way ‘dwelling’, in English, is not (dictionary entries typically note its use, beyond certain limited occurrences, as archaic or poetic).

Heidegger’s ‘What is it to dwell?’ queries the character of our ordinary being in the world—even though it also leads toward the essential [18]. This means that dwelling, if we are to remain with this English term, misleading though it is, does not name *one* mode of being as opposed to *another*—the nostalgic, perhaps, as opposed to the modern—but rather to the essential way human being is in the world.

In that case, there will be a sense in which we continue to dwell even in the face of modernity. What modernity changes is the way dwelling itself appears and the way in which our own understanding of dwelling and our own self-understanding is articulated.

If it were the case that dwelling did simply name one mode of being among others—although a mode that was no longer possible—then it would name something that could only be of historical or antiquarian interest. Dwelling would be something irretrievably *past* and irrelevant to our contemporary situation. It could play no role in a critical engagement with modernity—certainly not such that it would carry any normative force. There would be no reason why we should not embrace a complete and utter placelessness as our fate—and, not only that, but be content with it.

Yet there is a critical, normative force that does attach to Heidegger’s dwelling—a critical, normative force directed at technological modernity and what Heidegger clearly regards as its destructive character.

The point at issue here is quite general: Without some notion of that which is proper to being and to the human—without a notion of that to which each is appropriated and the manner of that appropriation—there can be no grounds for any critique of the manner of their contemporary disclosedness. The ‘effects’ of modernity—whether understood in terms of placelessness, alienation, or the dissolution of things into mere ‘resource’—are problematic only if set against a more fundamental measure that derives from an understanding of the extent to which even what appears lost still remains.

Modernity itself remains bound by the very ontological conditions that it also effaces and obscures (obscuring even its own character as obscuring). It is this that makes modernity problematic: It remains bound to its own topology at the very same time that it also promulgates its own overcoming of place, its own ‘abolition’ of the near and the far [19].

Thus the homelessness that is characteristic of modernity, in its very character *as homelessness*, is nevertheless still a relation to *home*, even if a relation of estrangement. One might say that the situation is one in which we remain homeless even when we are most essentially at home. As Heidegger writes:

We belong to being, and yet not. We reside in the realm of being and yet are not directly allowed in. We are, as it were, homeless in our ownmost homeland, assuming we may thus name our own essence. We reside in a realm constantly permeated by the casting toward and the casting-away of being. To be sure, we hardly ever pay attention to this characteristic of our abode, but we now ask: ‘where’ are we ‘there,’ when we are thus placed into such an abode? [20].

The Heideggerian questioning of dwelling is intended to turn us back to the original place invoked here—back to that place in which we always already are, but from which we are so often turned away, and which modernity threatens to hide almost completely.

The turning back—the *Kehre*—that is at issue here is not a turning back into the familiar and the secure. Rather, it is a turning back into the opening of a genuine questioning and listening—in contrast to the unquestioning attitude of modernity (an attitude that is itself tied to modernity’s refusal of place [21]).

It is a turning back that involves a proper attentiveness and responsiveness to the place in which we always already are—a place that appears, not as some already separated, determined ‘location’ but as constant gathering and differentiating in which we are taken up.

To dwell is to stand in such a relation of attentiveness and responsiveness, of listening and of questioning. The question of dwelling is never a question ever settled or finally resolved. To dwell is to remain in a state in which what it is to dwell—and what it is to dwell *here*, in *this place*—is a question constantly put anew.

Drawing on the language of *Being and Time*—the language of the ‘authentic’ and ‘inauthentic’ that has become so common among English readers—one might

say the authentic mode puts its own character as authentic in question. Authenticity would thus be tied, not to adherence to some determinate inner ‘truth’ but rather to an openness to what Heidegger calls the ‘event’ of appropriation—an openness to the happening of place [22].

What, against this background, does it mean *to belong* and especially *to belong to place*? Belonging here must be understood in relation to the idea of appropriation—belonging is thus both a being gathered into as well as a differentiating from—and so cannot be treated as if it were the relating of two otherwise separate, autonomous entities.

To say that we belong *to place* is to affirm the way in which our own identity and being are inseparably tied to the places in and through which our lives are worked out. This means that we cannot understand ourselves independently of the places in which our lives unfold, even though those places may be complex and multiple [23].

To say that we belong to place is also to affirm the questionability that lies at the heart of human existence. In belonging to place, we are drawn into the questionability of place, the questionability of dwelling, the questionability of our own identity, rather than into some secure, comfortable residence in which questioning has somehow been brought to an end.

Such questionability is itself placed, so questionability only emerges and takes on concrete form through place. It is thus that the question of dwelling, along with the question of our own identity and belonging, first arises—can only arise—in and through the specific places in which we find ourselves, in and through which we encounter other persons and things.

We thus begin in the singularity and specificity of place—of *this* place—as that which, precisely through its singularity and specificity, opens us to the world and the world to us.

Building, Dwelling, Place

‘What is dwelling?’ asks Heidegger. This question is one that he takes as directly relevant to the question as to how we can build and the nature of such building. Building, including the particular mode of building that is exemplified in architectural practice, depends on dwelling. What should now be evident, however, is that this dependence is not a matter of building

somehow determined by an already existing mode of life, not even one rooted in tradition or history.

One cannot respond to the question of dwelling simply by appealing to forms of past life—as if all that is needed is to reinscribe the past into the present and the future. Similarly, from a specifically architectural perspective, one cannot respond to the issue of building that the question of dwelling invokes by an appeal merely to archaic or vernacular forms—nor even by a steadfast adherence to the tenets of some pre-existing architectural practice, whether it be derived from pre-modernist, modernist, or post-modernist traditions.

As it arises out of human dwelling, building must always be a responsive engagement in and with the place in which it is constituted as *building*. There is no rule or formula determining how this is done, not only because there is no rule or formula determining the character of dwelling or of place, but because responsiveness, in any real sense, cannot be determined in advance, certainly not by means of any rule or formula.

Building involves a responsiveness to place. But in that case, building does not ‘make’ places and neither does architecture. Equally, however, places do not ‘make’ architecture nor do they predetermine building in any complete, unequivocal fashion. For example, even the built form that derives from a response to certain pre-eminent climatic or topographic features still retains a degree of architectural autonomy in relation even to those features.

This is not only because place is itself responsive to the architectural (which does not mean that place cannot also resist certain architectural impositions) but because the architectural engagement with place involves a relation of appropriation—a ‘belonging together’, a gathering and being-gathered, a unifying and differentiating—of exactly the sort that Heidegger describes in ‘The Principle of Identity’ as well as in ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’.

From this perspective, one might say that architecture is itself a certain mode of appropriation—in the sense that Heidegger uses the term—and that architecture is therefore a practice whose own character as a practice is always in question in its practice.

Contrary to the sorts of reading so often associated with Norberg-Schulz and others, Heidegger’s focus on dwelling and place does not return us to some

pre-modern utopia in which the uncertainties of modernity can be laid to rest. Neither does it imply commitment to some form of authoritarian, exclusionary politics. Instead, Heidegger leads us toward a critical rethinking of the key concepts that are at issue here—a rethinking in which the idea of place itself plays a crucial role.

It is through the return to place and to a mode of thinking that is attuned to place that the possibility of genuine questioning—as well as listening—appears.

Notes

1. See 'Building Dwelling Thinking', in *Poetry, Language, Thought* (NY: Harper & Row, 1971), pp. 145–61.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 160.
3. See especially C. Norberg-Schulz, *The Concept of Dwelling: On the Way to Figurative Architecture* (Milan: Rizzoli, 1985).
4. 'Topology' is a term I take directly from Heidegger—see especially 'Seminar in Le Thor 1969', in *Four Seminars* (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 2004), p. 47.
5. See my *Heidegger's Topology* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2008), especially chap. 3, pp. 65–146; I discuss some of the difficulties surrounding Heidegger's treatment of place (and space) in *Being and Time*.
6. As is evident even in some of the exposition of Heidegger's view in A. Scharr's *Heidegger for Architects* (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2007); see esp. pp. 112–13. Scharr speaks of "Heidegger's problematic authenticity claims and the potential consequences of his romantic provincialism," writing that "[Heidegger] perceived the essence of building and dwelling in authentic attunement to being, unapologetic about the tendencies of essentialism and authenticity to exclude people."
7. See E. Levinas, 'Heidegger, Gagarin, and Us', in *Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism* (London: Athlone Press, 1990), pp. 231–34; also 'Is Ontology Fundamental?' in *Emmanuel Levinas: Basic Philosophical Writings*, A. T. Peperzak, S. Critchley, & R. Bernasconi, eds. (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1996), pp. 1–10.
8. Levinas, 'Heidegger, Gagarin, and Us', p. 233 (n. 7).
9. M. Cacciari, 'Eupalinos or Architecture', *Oppositions*, 21 (1980), pp. 106–16; quotation, p. 107.
10. I would also argue for retaining a rethought (and more positively weighted) concept of the nostalgic—see my 'Philosophy's Nostalgia', in *Heidegger and the Thinking of Place* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2012), pp. 161–76.
11. In *Identity and Difference* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2002), pp. 23–41.
12. In *Heidegger's Topology*, I summarily characterize the *Ereignis* as the 'disclosive happening of belonging' as a way of

drawing together the notions of gathering/belonging, happening, and revealing/disclosing that all seem to be involved here—see *Heidegger's Topology*, pp. 217–18 (n. 5).

13. In texts such as 'On the Essence of Truth' (1930) in the early thinking; to 'The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking' (1964), in the later. See 'On the Essence of Truth', in *Pathmarks* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1998), pp. 134–56; and 'The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking', in *On Time and Being*, (NY: Harper & Row, 1972), pp. 55–73.

14. *Identity and Difference*, p. 7 (n. 11).

15. The original claim is made by Heidegger in 'The Question Concerning Technology', in *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays* (NY: Harper & Row, 1977), p. 35.

16. See M. Heidegger, *On The Way to Language* (NY: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 72.

17. Heidegger makes a claim similar to this in *Being and Time*. Acknowledging the way even our thinking of time seems to be infused with spatial language, he aims to preempt any suggestion that this might compromise the primacy of the temporal by arguing that the way spatial language seems to come to the fore is a consequence of Dasein's prioritization of a particular mode of temporality, namely, being-present in the present (and also of the mode of 'falling'); see *Being and Time* (NY: Harper & Row, 1962), H369.

18. This is an issue I discuss at greater length in my 'Heidegger, Aalto, and the Limits of Design', in D. Espinet & T. Hildebrandt, eds., *Suchen Entwerfen Stiften: Randgänge zu Heideggers Entwurfsdenken* (Munich: Fink-Verlag, 2013).

19. As Heidegger makes clear in 'The Thing', in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, esp. pp. 166–67 (n. 1).

20. M. Heidegger, *Basic Concepts* (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1993), p. 75.

21. See *Heidegger's Topology*, pp. 291ff. (n. 5).

22. There are good reasons for thinking, however, that 'authenticity' is itself a problematic concept—see my 'From Extremity to Release: Place, Authenticity, and the Self', in H. Pedersen & L. Hatab, eds., *The Horizons of Authenticity: Essays in Honor of Charles Guignon's Work on Phenomenology, Existentialism, and Moral Psychology* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013). One might argue that the connotations of 'authenticity' in English make it an awkward term, at best, to use as a translation of the term *Eigentlichkeit* that Heidegger uses in *Being and Time* (*Eigentlichkeit* is itself linked etymologically to *Ereignis*).

23. See my discussion of this in *Place and Experience: A Philosophical Topography* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1999), especially chaps. 6 and 7. There is an important connection between the essential placedness of human being and its factual thrownness—the latter referring to the character of human being in the world as a 'being-thrown' into a concrete situation (a key idea in *Being and Time*). One might say that existence is always a working-out of that concrete situatedness.